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OUTSOURCING THE LAW:  
HISTORY AND THE DISCIPLINARY LIMITS  
OF CONSTITUTIONAL REASONING 
Helen Irving* 
INTRODUCTION 
Debates about the use of history in constitutional interpretation find their 
primary nourishment in the originalism debate.  This has generated a vast 
amount of literature,1 but also narrowed the terms of the debate.  
Originalism is a normative commitment wrapped in a questionable 
methodological confidence.  Regardless of the multiple forms originalism 
takes,2 originalists are confident that the meaning (in the sense of intention) 
that animated the framing of the Constitution can be ascertained and, 
indeed, that they can ascertain it.  The debate has largely focused, then, on 
whether modern-day scholars and jurists can ascertain original historical 
meaning or, alternatively, whether they have gotten the history right in 
attempting to do so. 
This debate has not been static.  Some originalists have conceded that the 
original intent of the Constitution’s Framers cannot be known, and they 
have embraced the new alternative, “public meaning” originalism, which 
seeks constitutional meaning in what would have generally been understood 
as the meaning of the text at the time of the Constitution’s framing.3  The 
scope of the relevant historical inquiry has accordingly widened.  Further 
debate has emerged, including over whether the new originalism offers a 
real alternative to the old.4 
 
*  Professor of Law, Sydney Law School, The University of Sydney. 
 
 1. In 2013, Jack Balkin observed that there is “by now a large literature on the proper 
use of history in constitutional argument.” Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the 
Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 644 (2013).  The footnote supporting this claim, 
see id. at 644 n.1, references multiple publications, many of which are concerned with 
“interpretive debates about originalism.” Id. at 644.  The symposium in which Balkin’s 
Article appears, New Originalism in Constitutional Law, expands the list, but it is notable 
that only Balkin and two others, including Saul Cornell, see infra note 5, discuss historical 
methodology. 
 2. Mitchell Berman has identified more than seventy iterations. See Mitchell N. 
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009). 
 3. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 923, 933 (2009). 
 4. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704–09 (2009). 
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For all this, as Saul Cornell points out, there remains a serious lacuna in 
most contributions to the originalism debate:  “Far less attention has been 
devoted to analyzing the flaws in the underlying historical theory associated 
with originalism.”5  This observation is well placed.  It applies not only in 
the United States, but also in other constitutional systems where judges 
have attempted to use (what they take to be) history in reaching 
interpretative conclusions.6  However, the objection to the use of history in 
constitutional interpretation, I suggest, is more fundamental.  It also applies 
to constitutional interpretation generally and is not confined to a particular 
jurisdiction or constitutional culture.  As a non-American, I explore this 
objection at a general level:  it concerns whether judges should be using 
history at all. 
I.  CAN JUDGES DO HISTORY? 
The first dimension of the objection to the use of history in constitutional 
interpretation, it might be thought, is that judges are not equipped to deal 
with history or to assess alternative historical accounts because they lack 
the disciplinary training.7  This objection maintains that judges do not know 
how to access or assess primary sources and must rely, inexpertly, on 
secondary sources written by historians who have been trained, but whose 
competence they cannot judge.  As William Novak writes (of lawyers who 
write history), “if one does not have any previous independent experience 
with a substantial range of primary sources in a given [historical] field,” 
how does one know which of the secondary sources offers the most 
“accurate, convincing, and authoritative account[?]”8 
But this objection misconstrues the issue when it comes to judges.  
Disciplinary competence is important, but the question of competence is not 
one of capacity.  Rather, it is one of discipline.  History and judging operate 
in different fields; they belong to different disciplines.  Historians and 
judges are not just people with different titles; they are people with different 
jobs.  This does not mean that professional historians alone can write 
history.  Nor does it mean that originalist judges on constitutional courts 
should be “trained” in history if they are to engage satisfactorily in 
constitutional interpretation. 
If we conclude that judges cannot use history because they are untrained, 
we are imagining history as a closed field, only open to initiates.  This is 
 
 5. Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:  
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 722 (2013). 
 6. See Helen Irving, Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline 
of History, 41 FED. L. REV. 95, 108–20 (2013) (discussing the High Court of Australia and 
the unrigorous (and growing) use of history in constitutional interpretation). 
 7. H. Jefferson Powell made this point early in the originalism debate.  He also 
acknowledged that judges will “continue to invoke the past” and with this in mind set out 
rules for the “responsible” use of history. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 659, 661 (1987). 
 8. William J. Novak, Constitutional Theology:  The Revival of Whig History in 
American Public Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 623, 642. 
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both elitist and inaccurate.  Historians become historians by researching and 
writing history.  Their formation may be guided by others or self-guided, 
but the doing and the formation are interdependent.9  Certainly, there are 
rules of practice, and these are conveyed by, or in, the work of experienced 
historians.10  But historians also disagree about the rules:  whether primary 
sources must be the exclusive focus of research, whether oral accounts of 
the past are the equivalent of written records, what constitutes an 
anachronism, and so on.  Historians disagree, too, about the purpose of 
writing history.  Lines drawn around these disagreements frame the work of 
individual historians and the subfields of history.  There are, nevertheless, 
shared disciplinary parameters and common ways of practicing the craft, 
but there are no accreditation tests. 
Of course, judges can do history.  Some may indeed have studied it on 
their path to legal training.  Some may have trained themselves.  There is 
nothing about being a historian that is beyond the capacity of a judge.  (This 
also means that judges are not incapable of recognizing their own 
limitations in using history and cannot claim disciplinary naivety.)  Doing 
work that counts as writing history is open to anyone who wants to practice 
it.11  Judging, in contrast, is not open to anyone who wants to do it.  A 
person may claim that he or she is competent to judge.  He or she may even 
write “judgments.”  But only a real judge can do the real job of judging.  
Judges are legally trained persons who are authorized to work as judges.  
Historians are persons who research and write convincingly enough to get 
published. 
Unsatisfactory histories get published, but no one is disbarred for writing 
one.  Probably most histories, even those of the great and celebrated, 
contain factual errors.  No historian loses her (nonexistent) license for 
getting the odd fact wrong.  Guidance as to the reliability of a historical 
account lies in the evidence of thorough research and the persuasiveness of 
the interpretation, supplemented by reviews written by other historians in 
the field or the perspectives of later works.  Of course it matters to the 
reputation of the individual historian and the relevant publishing house if 
poorly sourced or erroneous or absurd conclusions are drawn in a published 
historical work, but (unlike in law) no other consequences follow. 
But this is just the background to the main disciplinary issue.  Whether 
judges have the right to apply history in resolving legal disputes is not a 
question of competence but of disciplinary legitimacy.  Judges are not 
 
 9. Barry Friedman’s account of how he, a law professor, became a historian in the 
course of researching his book, BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC 
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1st ed. 2009), illustrates this well. See also generally Barry Friedman, 
Discipline and Method:  The Making of the Will of the People, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877. 
 10. My observations about the methodological principles of historical research are 
drawn from the classic account, MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN’S CRAFT (Peter Putnam 
trans., 1953), as well as from my own training as a historian. 
 11. Novak makes the same point:  “[T]he [historian’s] door is open to almost anyone 
who wants to try their hand at the art or craft.” Novak, supra note 8, at 624. 
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“qualified” to act as historians.  If they act as historians, they cease to be 
judges.  If they work as judges, they are not historians.  The reasons lie in 
the difference between law and history, in the answer to the celebrated 
question, “what is history?”12 
II.  WHAT IS HISTORY? 
The noun “history” carries its own ambiguities.  It refers both to the past 
and to accounts written about the past.  It is the latter that is of concern in 
understanding why judges should not use history.  Of course, there are 
unmediated records of the past, including of laws and judgments, upon 
which judges routinely and legitimately draw.  This use of the historical 
record is not, in itself, controversial.  But judges need to understand the 
difference between the record and history itself.  History is not a matter of 
collecting or recording data from the past, nor is it a catalogue of events.  
History is an epistemology.  It is a particular type of understanding, a way 
of knowing the world.  It is a matter of explanation, of interpretation.  
Historical interpretation is not constitutional interpretation.  The interpretive 
differences are not merely differences in object. 
While it may be true that history “is written in the present and for the 
present . . . [and] inevitably reflects the concerns of the moment,”13 the 
concerns and the inquiry are radically different from those of law.  If 
historians’ inquiries are animated by current concerns (or, alternatively, 
publishers’ choices are animated by what they believe will attract readers in 
the present), historians still explore and explain how the past is different 
from the present.  Judges deal with legal disputes of the present.  In F.W. 
Maitland’s words, “What the lawyer wants is authority and the newer the 
better; what the historian wants is evidence and the older the better.”14  
Judges do not choose their subject or the questions they wish to pursue, and 
they cannot rest their decisions on their own historical research.  The 
questions asked by historians are historical questions; the questions shape 
the understanding.  Regardless of the multiple subfields of history, 
historians ask common questions; they seek to understand dissimilarities, to 
describe a world that is no longer intact.  They cannot say whether a law 
passed in 2015 is constitutionally valid or invalid.  That is not a historical 
question. 
History, furthermore, is not instrumental.  History that lends itself to a 
particular purpose—the purpose of deciding whether a law is 
constitutionally valid—ceases to be history.  As Jack Rakove has written, 
 
 12. See generally E.H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? (R.W. Davies ed., 2d ed. 1987). 
 13. James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically:  A Manifesto of Pragmatic 
Hermeneutics, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 201, 201 (2012). 
 14. F. W. Maitland, Why the History of English Law Is Not Written:  An Inaugural 
Lecture 14 (Oct. 13, 1888), in F. W. MAITLAND, WHY THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW IS NOT 
WRITTEN:  AN INAUGURAL LECTURE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1888). 
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“It is not the province of the historian to decide questions of law.”15  
Rakove observes, however, that historical knowledge can give 
constitutional interpretation the “rigor it often lacks.”16  One would hope 
that history, if used by courts, would be used rigorously, although the 
record tends to suggest otherwise.17  The amateur or tendentious use of 
“law office history” has attracted much criticism,18 as have the flawed 
historical conclusions reached by judges.  But the point remains:  however 
well or poorly they use history, judges should not outsource their legal 
decisions to historians.  This is, effectively, what happens when judges 
draw on secondary histories to reach constitutional conclusions in particular 
legal disputes. 
Importantly, history is a skeptical discipline.  Historical research must be 
done skeptically, without reaching conclusions until multiple sources have 
been studied, multiple perspectives considered, and the record has been 
thoroughly crossexamined and corroborated.19  Historians (at least those 
who do their work properly) should not rely on the accounts of others.  
They must be on the alert for tendentiousness and particularly wary of any 
historical claims of which politically interested parties, either in the past or 
the present, have made use.  The instrumental use of history is entirely at 
odds with the skeptical discipline required of historians. 
In addition, and for all these reasons, doing history takes a lot of time.  It 
requires years of work, meticulousness, and diligence.  It may, indeed, 
demand a lifetime’s dedication.  Judges, in contrast, must resolve legal 
disputes as expeditiously as possible.  They cannot take time off to research 
the history of a constitutional provision before applying the findings and 
conclusions of their research to a real life dispute.  This would be 
incompatible with the legitimate expectations of the parties, not to mention 
the judicial task. 
III.  THE INDETERMINACY BARRIER 
It is often observed that history is “disputed”—that historical accounts 
rest on shifting ground and that the historical jury is always “out.”  The 
indeterminacy of history is, perhaps, the claim most commonly made by 
those who caution against its use in legal reasoning.20  This objection also 
 
 15. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 11 (1997). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally Irving, supra note 6. 
 18. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:  An 
Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. 
 19. In Bloch’s words, “[F]rom the moment when we are no longer resigned to purely 
and simply recording the words of our [historical] witnesses . . . cross-examination becomes 
more necessary than ever.  Indeed it is the prime necessity of well-conducted historical 
research.” BLOCH, supra note 10, at 64. 
 20. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204, 237 (1980). 
962 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
 
misconstrues the reason courts should not use history.  It suggests that 
historians and their histories are essentially unreliable.  Of course historical 
accounts are routinely challenged and sometimes superseded, even 
discredited.  But historians who do their job well (as most do) can be 
confident that there is evidence for their claims about the past, including 
what people thought or are likely to have thought, and they are entitled to 
confidence that their interpretation is sound.  The fact that alternative 
historical interpretations are, or may become, available does not render all 
interpretations questionable.  It may merely indicate that there are 
alternative perspectives. 
The fact of conflicting historical interpretations does not mean that no 
distinction can be drawn between persuasive and unpersuasive historical 
accounts.  As Novak writes, competing histories notwithstanding, it should 
not be concluded that “all historical arguments are created equal or that 
there is no historical basis to distinguish divergent accounts”; there are 
historical standards, professional methods, “and coherent, contestable 
reasons for choosing or preferring one version of the past to another.”21  
But in rejecting the conclusion that history, being indeterminate, is always 
unreliable, we should not reach the alternative conclusion that judges may 
validly use history so long as they learn to distinguish the sound historical 
account from the unsound one and are committed to relying only on the 
former.  History, whether reliable or not, cannot be conflated with law. 
IV.  THE “ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING” ALTERNATIVE 
New public meaning originalism has, it seems, displaced “old” original 
intent originalism largely because old originalists have conceded to critics 
that the (subjective or collective) intentions of the Framers of the 
Constitution cannot be known or cannot account for the Constitution’s 
meaning.22  Certainly, the idea that constitutional meaning lies simply in the 
minds of the individuals who framed a constitution (if this is what anyone 
believes) is simplistic to the point of banal. 
The distinction between the two forms of originalism has, however, been 
exaggerated.  No “old” originalist can seriously propose seeking the 
subjective intentions of the Constitution’s Framers in the sense of reading 
their minds.  That sort of intention is unrecoverable and also meaningless.  
Even if we could access their thoughts (imagine, for example, that all of the 
Constitution’s Framers had kept private diaries in which they recorded their 
intimate personal views of the meaning of each provision of the 
Constitution and all these diaries were later published), the sort of 
information that would be gained, by itself, would not resolve historical 
interpretation.  It would be enormously interesting information, of course, 
but only as part of a much larger body of historical material, relevant to the 
 
 21. See Novak, supra note 8, at 628. 
 22. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 605 
(2004). 
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story of the Constitution’s framing but, on its own, conclusive of nothing.  
The more serious objection to old originalism is that historical meaning 
cannot reside in the record left by a tiny handful of individuals.23 
The problem, however, is not the difficulty in amassing information 
about the intentions of all the Framers.  Richard Elkins and Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy note that skepticism about the possibility of identifying a 
single legislative intention invokes “implausible accounts that take 
legislative intention to be the aggregate of the intentions of each individual 
legislator.”24  Such accounts also appear to animate the rejection of old 
originalism, involving (at their simplest) a caricature of the way in which 
history would need to work, if it were to offer an unambiguous meaning of 
a constitution or any of its provisions.  The problem with public meaning 
originalism does not lie, alternatively, in the impossibility of describing all 
the objective circumstances of those members of the public who can be 
thought of as the repositories of original public meaning.  No history could 
ever be written if the circumstances of every single historical subgroup, let 
alone every actor, had to be taken into account.  Group intentions, as Elkins 
and Goldsworthy suggest, can be identified, and they are not the same as 
aggregated individual intentions; collective social and institutional 
intentions arise out of actions directed toward a common end.25  The reason 
for questioning the application of history to constitutional law does not lie 
in the elusiveness of collective intention.  Indeed, historians commonly 
identify collective or dominant ideas, including intentions, in their subject 
era.  But, the historical identification of collective intentions (including 
those that animated the project of uniting previously separate polities or 
peoples under a national constitution) will tell us nothing specifically about 
the legal meaning of a constitutional provision. 
Even if we concluded that the words of a constitution directly revealed 
the intentions of its authors, as do the words of any other form of written 
communication,26 the resolution of a legal dispute would not be assisted.  
For a dispute to be resolved, a second level of communication is required:  
what the author of the words intended them to mean in the context of 
resolving the particular dispute.  We do not have that information.  Larry 
Alexander draws a “simple-minded” analogy between the words of (among 
 
 23. Justice Antonin Scalia explains that while he rejects recourse to the Framers’ intent, 
he is happy to rely on the writings of “some men who happened to be delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention,” as well as other contemporary leaders, “because their writings, 
like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, display how the text of the 
Constitution was originally understood.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997).  It hardly needs stating that no historian would 
get away with deciding, in advance, that a limited range of sources, identified by the 
prominence of their authors, would reveal historical meaning. 
 24. Richard Elkins & Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Reality and Indispensability of 
Legislative Intentions, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 39, 63 (2014). 
 25. Id. at 64; see also Kay, supra note 4, at 707–08 (arguing that collective, shared 
meaning can be identified). 
 26. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History As Constitutional Theory, 
101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015). 
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other things) a shopping list and the words of a constitution.27  Both convey 
communicative meaning.  But, if the author, or authors, of the list is not the 
person doing the shopping, and if a brand-specific item on the list is 
unavailable, how do we know what the author intends the shopper to do?  
Should he buy an alternative brand or buy nothing?  The author might have 
an answer, but the words on the list will not reveal it.28  The historian can 
reconstruct the likely universe of answers (taking into account, for example, 
the availability of other brands at the relevant time and contemporary 
cultural norms or practices regarding consumer choices), but these will only 
provide possible alternatives, not the answer. 
What people are plausibly likely to have thought (or not to have thought) 
will be found in “the range of possible meanings” at a particular moment in 
history.29  This range can be known with a reasonable degree of confidence, 
at least for the historical eras in which modern constitutions were written.  
But it is a range, not a single meaning.  The range of meanings for which 
the historian looks will embrace the meanings relevant to the law, but the 
significance of these meanings for the choices available in the past are not 
the meanings for which the judge looks.  Notwithstanding that multiple 
conclusions about the meaning of a constitutional provision may find 
expression in the differing or dissenting opinions of judges, the resolution 
of a constitutional dispute must be conclusive; it must produce an 
enforceable conclusion.  That conclusion is not merely different from a 
historical conclusion because it is enforceable; it is epistemologically 
different.  It belongs to a different field of understanding. 
Is the solution that historians should write history specifically tailored to 
the meanings relevant to the law?  Novak calls on practitioners of 
constitutional history to “think seriously about what they are doing and not 
doing, to be explicit about what they are doing and especially how they are 
doing it, and to try to raise the bar generally for the practice of history in 
law.”30  Who can object?  But if such an admonition were taken seriously, it 
would generate a type of specialized narrative voice, speaking 
instrumentally to judges, anticipating legal disputes.  It would, effectively, 
be preemptive opinion writing.  It would not be history.  It is the judges, 
rather, who should think seriously about what they are doing in using 
history, about their own qualification for judging history (no matter how 
historically “trained” they may be), and about whether they should be 
 
 27. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 
87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
 28. A range of binary distinctions for reconciling a constitution’s original intended 
meaning with its later application meaning can be found in the literature; these include 
constitutional “interpretation” versus constitutional “construction,” see Solum, supra note 
26, at 1118–23, and “enactment intentions” versus “application intentions,” see Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV. 1, 20 (1997).  
They do not assist in finding the original meaning, however, nor do they explain the role of 
history in interpretation. 
 29. Cornell, supra note 5, at 728. 
 30. Novak, supra note 8, at 630. 
2015] OUTSOURCING THE LAW 965 
 
outsourcing the job of constitutional interpretation to those whose work 
explains other things. 
None of this means that legal history should not be written, that 
historians should avoid constitutional history, or that constitutional lawyers 
cannot be historians.31  At the very least, however, if judges are to use 
historical accounts to reach their legal conclusions, they should do so 
carefully and circumspectly.  They should say why they have chosen 
particular historians over others and on what basis they have found a 
particular historical account more persuasive than others.  If the (unlikely) 
reason is that the judge has read and compared all the alternative historical 
accounts, and has been persuaded by the scholarship, the thoroughness, or 
the mastery of one over the other, the judge should reveal this.  But, even 
scrupulous judges should not allow historians to settle the law. 
V.  THE “HISTORICAL” CONSTITUTION 
History, as history, is and should be outside of the hands of judges.  The 
job of judges is to interpret the law, not history.  What makes history so 
tempting for constitutional law, however—apart from normative 
undertakings to follow only what was agreed in the past, which have their 
own difficulties, but are a different matter—is that constitutions are 
instruments of precommitment.  They are not the equivalent of statutes that 
may be altered by the ordinary legislative process.  Constitutions are meant 
to be entrenched and to endure and, for this reason, to be anchored in the 
past.  The weight of the anchor, the details of the precommitment, and the 
levels of generality or specificity by which the constitution’s endurance is 
to be measured remain open to debate.  That debate cannot be resolved by 
history.  History may appear to offer guidance, but this is an illusion. 
Historians can reconstruct the context in which a constitution emerged.  
They can identify the range of possible meanings.  But they cannot resolve, 
or even enlighten, a legal dispute.  It is not a historical question to ask, for 
example, whether people in the 1780s would have wanted a state to be free 
to establish a bottle-recycling scheme.32  Such a question involves a 
fundamental anachronism and goes beyond even intelligible 
counterfactualism.  A constitution’s silence on the matter may be 
interpretively relevant, but no historian would reach the conclusion that 
silence on a proposition at a particular moment in history indicated either 
contemporary approval or disapproval of that proposition.  The best the 
historian could say is that silence may indicate that the matter fell outside 
 
 31. Nor does it mean that history is not relevant to legal theory or the evolution of legal 
concepts.  Legal theory and history are, Nicola Lacey argues, “in dialogue.” Nicola Lacey, 
Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 919, 945 
(2015). 
 32. This is an issue that has confronted more than one country’s constitutional court. 
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v S Austl (1990) 169 CLR 436 (Austl.). 
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the range of possible meanings.  That observation could have no relevance 
to a determination of constitutional meaning. 
None of this is to say that reference to historical legal sources is 
prohibited.  The history (in the sense of record) of marriage laws, for 
example, will reveal that “marriage” has not had a static legal meaning over 
time or even a single definition across the common-law world, and this 
record may usefully assist a court in its reasoning about whether the legal 
meaning of marriage may continue to evolve and may be relevant to 
determining whether a constitution “permits” same-sex marriage.  But the 
history of marriage is a large and highly complex subject, going well 
beyond the law, involving multiple cultural, social, and personal practices.  
To draw a legal conclusion from the historical record is not to do or even to 
use history any more than relying on the words of one or more of a 
constitution’s framers is using history.  It is merely to make a heuristic 
choice:  whatever the legal record reveals will stand for the “meaning” of 
this provision.  This approach may provide some certainty (although it will 
not resolve normative questions about whether intention expressed in the 
past should be followed).  But the record of past law is not history. 
CONCLUSION 
No doubt, there can be great satisfaction on the part of a judge in reading 
works by historians and learning something about the contemporary public 
understanding of a constitutional provision in the era of its adoption.  And a 
historical account that supports the legal conclusion to which the judge was 
already tending must be irresistible.  But, the idea that the use of such an 
account amounts to using history in constitutional interpretation is illusory.  
At most, it amounts to using a fragment of a historical account, 
decontextualized and detached from the historical explanation and the 
historian’s purpose.  History is not merely a jigsaw puzzle from which 
individual pieces or fragments can be lifted.  History is the full canvas; it is 
a way of understanding human life.  Law is a way of applying particular 
rules in the organization of human life.  History is no more relevant to law 
than, for example, theology. 
In the end, however, it is unlikely that at least some judges will be 
deterred from recourse to secondary historical sources (which they may 
allow themselves to think of as applying history), especially where the 
meaning of a constitutional provision is highly controversial, has proven 
evasive, or has undergone multiple alternative interpretations over time in 
the case law.33  If so, the judge has a duty to know something about the 
discipline of history.  The admonition against the use of history in 
constitutional interpretation should not inhibit exposure and criticism of the 
flawed or tendentious use of history by judges.  Nor should it suggest that 
judges need not reflect seriously upon what they are doing when they use 
 
 33. I discuss a particular case of history as an interpretative last resort in Irving, supra 
note 6, at 124. 
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history.  Judges should know that history and law are different disciplinary 
fields.  They should learn, if they do not already know, that there is no 
single historical methodology and no single object of historical research.  If 
they purport to rely on history, they should make principled decisions about 
the methodology they employ.  They should understand that cherry-picking 
from historical “facts” or the utterances of individuals is not doing history 
(and they should know that a fact only becomes a “historical fact” “when 
the historian calls upon [it]”34).  They should recognize anachronisms and 
discipline themselves to avoid them, no matter how convenient these may 
be.  They should also avoid reliance on what I elsewhere have described as 
“endogenous corroboration”—namely, drawing meaning from what 
members of a dedicated purposive community (such as a constitutional 
convention) said about each other’s propositions.35  They must never 
assume that they know what the historical research will reveal and should 
be skeptical about historical claims based on limited research or limited 
sources.  H. Jefferson Powell wrote that “wise constitutional interpreters do 
not rest absolute positions on the shifting sands of historical opinion.”36  
Wise constitutional interpreters, in other words, avoid using history. 
 
 34. CARR, supra note 12, at 10–121.  As should scholars engaged in the originalism 
debate.  For example, Richard Kay, challenging Powell’s historical conclusions about the 
Framers’ interpretive intentions, see generally Powell, supra note 7, bluntly states:  “The 
content of the constitution-makers’ intentions . . . is itself a historical fact.” Kay, supra note 
4, at 709.  He then sets out an alternative conclusion to Powell’s (that of Robert G. Natelson) 
which Kay claims to have “more or less settle[d] the case.” Id.  But the very existence of 
differing historical accounts of the “content” of the Framers’ intentions indicates that it is not 
a “fact” in the sense Kay appears to mean; rather, it is a “historical fact” in Carr’s sense, one 
for which the interpretive case cannot be “settled.” 
 35. Irving, supra note 6, at 105; see also Walter F. Murphy, Constitutional 
Interpretation:  The Art of the Historian, Magician or Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1764–
68 (1978) (book review). 
 36. Powell, supra note 7, at 680. 
